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Good Fences Make Good Neighbours: Assessing the Role of Consociational Politics in 
Transitional Justice* 
 
Abstract: This essay reflects on the relationship of transitional justice theory and practice and 
consociational theory and practice to conflict transformation in deeply divided ethnic polities. We 
address the identity politics of transitional justice and the political forms that enable, define, and 
instantiate transition with a particular view to their interaction with power–sharing and 
consociationalism-type arrangements in the aftermath of systematic atrocity or sustained repression. 
We provide a pragmatic, perhaps sceptical, account of the triumph of consociationalism as the 
preferred transitional accommodation and point to the ‘dark side’ of governance arrangements in 
post–conflict settings with implications for their capacity to generate cycles of violence and repeat 
conflict patterns.  We are particularly drawn to exploring the ways in which, despite substantive 
acknowledgement of the limits of consociationalism, it continues to be the preferred solution offered 
by internationally and bilaterally mediated peace negotiations as a means to address the governance 
crisis of deeply divided societies. We address the synergies and dissonances of how transitional justice 
and consociationalism support and undermine each other, and make some practical suggestions.  In 
so doing, we look at how transitional justice interacts with different forms of power-sharing; the 
tensions in the peace versus justice debates which are central to TJ theory and practice and how they 
interact with consociational forms of governance; the relationship between community versus 
individual rights in consociational settlements; and how the emphasis on TJ theory and practice on 
'bottom-up, victim led' processes interact with consociational debate on grassroots versus elite 
interactions.  
 
a. Consociationalism and its Critics: Where Sits Transitional Justice? 
 
Critiques of consociational approaches are decades old and have already been addressed 
substantively by other scholars, but it is useful to summarise the key line of attack: namely, that 
consociationalism is anti-liberal in prioritising groups over individuals, entrenches segmental 
cleavages, and leads to political immobilism.  That political freeze is particularly damaging to divided 
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societies, particularly those where the return to communal violence is present. Centripetalists (or 
integrationists) argue for mechanisms which incentivise interethnic co-operation prior to government 
formation.1 Those in the power dividing camp favour a combination of checks and balances, powerful 
bodies to protect individual rights, and a dispersal of power that is not open to capture by communal 
or ethnic elites.2 In response, consociational proponents have not remained static and have responded 
by nuancing their commitment to mutual veto, grand coalition, cultural autonomy and proportionality 
in governing structures, and arguing for liberal forms of consociationalism.  This latter avoids processes 
of ascriptive identification, and so arguably makes segmental cleavages more porous and allows for 
greater space to build parties around cross-identity support. Liberal consociationalism is also less 
wedded to grand coalitions, deeming government representation of a plurality within each communal 
segment largely sufficient, and emphasises the importance of protecting human rights. 3  More 
recently, complex consociation or forms of ‘power dividing’ have surfaced employing a commitment 
to the bones of consociational theory whilst applying meat from centripetal and power dividing 
strategies via commitments to rights protections and the avoidance of ascriptive identification.4 
Complex power-sharing presents itself as a hybrid between consociationalism and integrationalism, 
but if the Liphardt-ian genes remain dominant, it argues that it reflects the real world accretions and 
evolution that have taken place in the application of consociationalism in real world settings.  It is also 
important to acknowledge that because of the growth of liberal consociationalism and notions of 
complex power-sharing, human rights frameworks have become more accepted as part of the 
mechanisms of power-sharing. This rights discourse represents the confluence of two streams: one 
which emphasizes equality and protection in the present but with a focus on individual rights, and a 
second which seeks to deal with the poisonous legacy of large scale human rights abuses in the past 
by insisting on ongoing accountability. In the former, human rights jurisprudence has shaped political 
choices through the insistence that governmental arrangements comport to fundamental norms of 
non-discrimination and procedural due process, which are largely individual in their framing with 
                                                     
1 Horowitz, Donald L. Ethnic groups in conflict. University of California Press, 1985.; Sisk, Timothy D. Power 
sharing and international mediation in ethnic conflicts. US Institute of Peace Press, 1996. 
2 Roeder, Philip G., and Donald S. Rothchild. Sustainable peace: Power and democracy after civil wars. Cornell 
University Press, 2005. 
3  McGarry, John, and Brendan O’Leary. "Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal consociation as political 
prescription." International Journal of Constitutional Law 5.4 (2007): 670-698.; O’Leary, Brendan. “Debating 
Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory Arguments.” In From Power-Sharing to Democracy: Post-
Conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies, edited by Sid Noel, 3–43. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s 
University Press, 2005. 
4  Wolff, Stefan,. Situating Complex Power Sharing in the Conflict Settlement Literature available at 
http://www.stefanwolff.com/files/CPSbgrd.pdf 
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limited group implications.5 In the latter context, transitional justice, as its name implies, attempts to 
engage with transitional accountability with a focus on past perpetrators.  Both of these approaches 
are on a potential collision course with consociationalism: the equality approach because it places 
human rights in tension with some of the group focused solutions,6  particularly those that have 
ascription to groups at their heart, and the accountability approach because it suggests that those 
political-military leaders that consociationalism places at the heart of the new order may be held to 
account through criminal processes that would remove them entirely from the political process 
through investigation, indictment, prosecution, and conviction. Here, its potential linkage with power 
dispersal and the capacity to act as a power spoiler for consociational deals concluded after violent 
conflict is clear. Whilst notions of ‘justice’, and thus ‘law’, beat in the heart of this animal, it is a 
creature that must necessarily wade hip deep in the political waters of transition. 
 
b. Transitional Justice Meets Consociationalism 
This positionality will have implications for TJ processes when they must necessarily interact with 
consociationalism. The inevitability of that engagement is a critical juncture in understanding the 
overlaps and tension points that frame a transitional justice-consociationalism interface. Underneath 
their broadly similar interests in underwriting new peaceful forms for regulating conduct in conflicted 
societies, TJ and consociational power arrangements differ in their respective ideological foundation. 
TJ has its origins in a discourse of human rights that has emphasized protecting the individual against 
infringing power as well as the independent right-bearing entitlements of individuals; this is expressed 
in a cosmopolitan frame elevating a common universal humanity, intrinsic to all, the protection of 
which is a touchstone of proper social and political organisation.  TJ has embedded cornerstones of 
accountability and remedy that inevitably make claims upon political processes and political 
institutions. Thus, a central part of transitional justice processes involves institutional reform. Years or 
decades of large-scale abuses and/or conflict leave extremely weak state institutions that are 
incapable of delivering truth, justice, and reconciliation. State institutions are also to be reformed in 
cases where the entire state apparatus took part or tolerated human rights violations, such as with 
                                                     
5 See e.g. ECHR In Sejdic and FInci, the Court addressed the issue of a post-conflict power sharing system and its 
compatability with equality norms. The case raised issues under P1-3 and Article 14 and also Protocol 12.  The 
decision came under Protocol 12, and the court treated the matter as one of straightforward discrimination on 
racial grounds – “a particularly egregious kind of discrimination” which required “special vigilance and a vigorous 
reaction” from the authorities.  
6 McCrudden, C., & O’Leary, B,. Courts and Consociations: Human Rights versus Power-Sharing Oxford: Oxford 
University Press (2013); Christine Bell 'Power-sharing and Human Rights Law' (2013) The International Journal 
of Human Rights 17 204-37 
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the army of security services. All these factors engage the local and international in change processes 
that criss-cross the lines between the political and the legal. 
None of this need be inimical to consociationalism, but its starting point is the group and a recognition 
of the reality of associations that form lasting, authentic segmented cleavages. As such, the group (be 
it ethno-national, ethno-sectarian, or some other iteration of social boundedness) becomes its 
primary concern and default ‘unit of analysis’. Therefore, in transitional moments its sights are firmly 
fixed on group access to power, proportionality of groups in governance, group vetoes, and a measure 
of autonomy for the cultural group.  In some fundamental sense, groups are not subject to any a priori 
exclusions, limitations, or qualifications in a consociational framing; transitional justice increasingly 
defines the capacity to engage, negotiate, and participate in political settlements through the lens of 
atrocity crime responsibility, the boundaries of amnesty law, and the restrictions on the political 
participation of perpetrators. 
This might imply that TJ and consociationalism will make an ill-fit in any realignment of the political 
order to which they are drawn. To be sure, it may seem that the centripetal approach speaks more 
readily to TJ’s cosmopolitanism, or that power dividing draws from a well of constitutionalism and 
rights protections more palatable to its legal and universalist reference points. The power dividing and 
centripetalist prescriptions, it has been noted, have been polemically attacked as somewhat 
patronising and utopian, each underrating the authenticity and longevity of group identification7—
would TJ deserve this pejorative label too? Given its insistence on the interrogation of some of the 
worst practices that humans, individually and in the name of the group, can inflict on one another, 
there is reason to doubt that it lacks a cold–eyed stare.  Consociationalism deals with the 
embeddedness of group identification as a cold fact, to be recognised and regulated; dissolution or 
realignment of ‘groupness’ is placed further down the track, rather off the political horizon. If TJ might 
be uncomfortable with an emphasis on group accommodation as the centre of gravity given its 
genealogy, nurture—the hybridity of its practical experience—has meant that it can attempt to work 
alongside consociational processes. There is no magnetic repulsion between the two, but there are a 
series of real or potential encounters which can both compliment or complicate the goals of each. 
 
c.  Interactions - Mapping the Positive and Negative 
                                                     
7 Tonge, Jonathan. Comparative peace processes. John Wiley & Sons, 2014. 
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These encounters will produce a range of interactions that may be complicated and, possibly, exist in 
tension. Yet other points of intersection between TJ and consociationalism may produce 
complementary processes and even mutual reinforcement. We map them, not altogether neatly, into 
‘negative’ and ‘positive’ interactions.  
Negative Interaction 
If early motifs on transitional justice forcibly brought attention to the dilemmas of prosecution and 
the need for compromise (leading to practices of amnesty and forgiveness), there is now a greater 
contemporary reliance on the language of impunity and the imperative to prosecute where possible. 
This is particularly evident in the trenchant emergence of international criminal law, the retreat from 
using amnesty laws, and the emerging requirement that national legal systems perform a meaningful 
part in enforcing domestic criminal law. Other patterns are constant.  These include the emphasis on 
a right to truth for victims, the value of victim acknowledgment and participation in legal processes 
addressing the past, and the need to provide repair and reparation to victims.   
The first potentially negative interaction has been much discussed in the  ‘peace versus justice’ debate 
and follows from these core focal points—the belief that TJ processes which frustrate amnesties by 
invoking the need to avoid impunity through prosecution will frustrate attempts to compose the elite 
accommodation necessary for power–sharing. Elite actors who face indictment for gross violations of 
human rights or humanitarian law will be unwilling to cut a deal which effectively grants power and 
legitimacy to the institutions which will lock them away; instead they are likely to either act as spoilers 
if they cannot leverage the deal to block prosecutions.8 The argument runs that a commitment to 
prosecute will privilege justice for past wrongs at the expense of peace in the present and future, with 
the risk that a political vacuum will develop that may allow further violence to take place in the 
absence of a peace deal. 
There are other potentially adverse interactions. Consociational institutions rely on a measure of elite 
control, not just accommodation. That control becomes highly problematized when elite leaders are 
identified as responsible for or tolerant of prior human rights violations. Levitt, among others, has 
argued that once one adds human rights norms into peace agreements establishing power–sharing 
deals with warlords or chronic human rights abusers, the deals not only become meaningless but also 
take on a schizophrenic character.9 TJ processes may kindle the grassroots by picking at deeply held 
                                                     
8 Vandeginste, Stef, and Chandra Lekha Sriram. "Power Sharing and Transitional Justice: A Clash of 
Paradigms?." Global Governance 17.4 (2011): 489-505. 
9 See Levitt, “Illegal Peace? Examining the Legality of Power-sharing with Warlords and Rebels in Africa” (2006) 
Michigan Journal of International Law 495, 577. 
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narratives of conflict or pursuing local actors who have strong local power bases.  This “bottom up” TJ 
is often ignited by an emphasis on local harms, specific violations, and the transformative effect on 
political mobilizing that can follow from a rights-based awakening.  Elite accommodation may exist at 
the top, but they might find certain power levers are unresponsive or resistant due to this kindling at 
the base.  Attempts to deal with the human rights violations of the past may simply become 
displacement battles for both elites and grassroots, as hard conflict becomes translated into a battle 
between narratives that may ultimately undermine trust and seep into the everyday working of 
consociational institutions.  Biting at the heels of these political interactions are concrete national and 
international processes of criminal law accountability that increasingly populate the transitional 
justice domain. 
Allied to the previous two points, TJ reckoning may provide a usable forum for ethnic entrepreneurs 
who chastise a communal elite with backsliding,10 rather than supporting, the narratives and interests 
of the group. More assertively, victimhood of their own group as spotlighted by TJ may be used as a 
lever to advance narrow political goals. Either way, TJ can provide a space and resources for processes 
of ethnic outbidding.  
TJ may also affect the legitimacy of consociational peace packages. It may act to partially corrode the 
legitimacy of the state institutions themselves, by continually shining a spotlight on mass violence that 
created certain ‘facts on the ground’ from which a power–sharing peace deal developed.   Institutional 
complicity has also increasingly become the focus of investigation for command and control 
responsibility by both civilian and military leaders, a fact that keeps the impunity spotlight on 
individuals who paradoxically turn out to be central to the delivery of functional politics in transitional 
societies. The ethnic cleansing and genocide committed in Republika Srpska, rightfully highlighted by 
the International Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), is nevertheless used by Bosniak 
nationalists as proof that the Bosnian Serb Republic is an entity whose legitimate power is 
compromised because it is built on genocidal foundations.11 Yet, if TJ is insufficiently searching in 
revealing rights abuses, this may eat away at the legitimacy of the consociational deal in total; this can 
have direct repercussions for the functioning of power–sharing deals.  Across multiple transitional 
societies, the long reach of accountability and its capacity to vault generations underpins the tenacity 
of justice claims in transitional societies and their ability to hold moral and legal sway on the 
                                                     
10  There is increased recognition that communal ethnic identity can be leveraged to consolidate legal 
advancement, political recognition, and social status across multiple spheres see e.g. Degart, Monica,. Ethnic 
Entrepreneurs: Identity and Development Politics in Latin America 2010, Stanford Univeristy Press. 
11 Majstorovic, Danijela, and Vladimir Turjacanin. Youth Ethnic and National Identity in Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
Social Science Approaches. Palgrave Macmillan, 2013. Nettelfield, Lara J., and Sarah Wagner. Srebrenica in the 
Aftermath of Genocide. Cambridge University Press, 2013.   
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governance deals made. As Christine Bell argues, international rights bodies are more likely to 
challenge the workings of consociational mechanisms if they perceive weakness in the legitimacy of 
state institutions and founding constitutions.12  
Positive Interaction 
We can map a series of possible positive interactions, too. There are a number of ways that TJ might 
engage with identities that  consociational deals are charged with hardening to the detriment of 
pluralism. By providing evidence of wrongdoing and allowing space for unheard stories, TJ may pick 
away at mythologies of conflict, self-regarding ethnic narratives that merely serve to validate a one–
sided view of conflict. Thus, it can ‘get at the scripts’ of ethnic chauvinism, mitigating their excesses 
and creating a more complex mosaic from which political compromise and transformation may follow.  
In this way, specifically as TJ highlights the individualized harm of conflict and repression, the group 
hollows out and the essential common vocabulary of loss, grief, damage, redemption, and resilience 
can emerge. 
By capturing and floating other narratives, TJ may serve to humanise the stories of conflict, opening 
out discourse about the past to encompass categories other than the major social and political 
cleavages. Narratives framed in terms of gender, youth, ‘good Samaritans,’ or smaller minorities that 
do not form part of the consociational package, may thereby partly reflavour and complicate ethnic 
identities and how communities interacted during periods of extremity.13 In consociations that have 
an ascriptive approach to peoplehood when dispersing power, this may help to shift societal (and 
ultimately, institutional) discourse towards validating non-ascriptive identities, providing a crucial 
leavening that speaks to ‘liberal consociationalism’.  TJ may also help diminish ethnic fears.  A key 
driver behind conflict is a sense of physical or cultural insecurity, something which the proportional 
dispersal of power in consociationalism attempts to address.  By addressing large scale rights abuses, 
and bedding down commitment to human rights and the rule of law in its discourse, TJ may thus help 
to reduce fear of further conflict, or a belief that a group must remain subaltern and a target for future 
repression.14 A line is drawn; if violence accentuated the initial rupture in group relations, processes 
of justice attempt a further and cleaner rupture with the past, digging a deep trench that makes a 
return to the logic of battlefields less likely. As claimed above, TJ may provide space for ethnic 
entrepreneurs to engage in outbidding as they cherry pick the outworkings of truth recovery or 
                                                     
12 Bell, Christine. "Power-sharing and human rights law." The International Journal of Human Rights 17.2 (2013): 
204-237. 
13 Arthur, Paige, ed. Identities in transition: Challenges for transitional justice in divided societies. Cambridge 
University Press, 2010. 
14 Arthur, id. 
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prosecutions, but it need not go wholly their way. The criticism that injecting TJ into a peace process 
will produce a tension reflecting justice versus peace, that the question of amnesties or opposing 
impunity will act as a solvent on peace making may be flawed as well.  Calibrating amnesties, 
introducing gradations and conditions, can mould TJ processes in a way that can attach to peace 
processing without either stifling peacemaking or accountability; there is evidence that this trend is 
underway.15 By supplying evidence that challenges or constrains ethnic myths of perpetual victimhood 
and providing narrative room for more nuanced forms of identification, TJ may act to constrain 
outbidding, if not erase it. Some cherries will remain out of reach, others will be as bitter as 
wormwood.  
TJ has also attempted to reduce the ethnic appropriation of court judgements, by individualising 
crime—projecting crimes against humanity as the result of individual criminal actions rather than the 
deeds perpetrated in the name of entire communities, something which would act as a splinter under 
the skin of any consociation.  However, mass human rights abuses, by their scale and nature, contain 
an undeniable collective dimension. Such violations or certain patterns of abuses create a collective 
trauma and affect entire communities and the society as a whole. There are countless instances in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) of local communities being identified by reference to a massacre 
that took place during the war. Atrocities committed by the Lord Resistance Army (LRA) in the DRC, 
Uganda, South Sudan, or the Central African Republic lead international actors to talk of “LRA-affected 
communities”. Revealing the truth about prior abuses becomes a condition (sine qua non) for the 
affected communities and society as a whole to recover. The purpose of transitional justice processes 
and mechanisms is then to also consider this collective dimension to address how a post-conflict 
society as a whole can recover.  These individual and collective dimensions may also account for the 
complex nature of the truth in post-conflict societies. First, the expectations, imperatives, and 
solutions when addressing the legacy of large-scale abuses will vary depending on whether one 
considers the viewpoint of victims as individuals or the society as a whole. The need to uncover the 
comprehensive truth/accountability will not be dealt with according to the same criteria and motives 
when addressing it as a collective matter. Second, this collective dimension sheds some light on 
another element of truth and accountability dynamics. It is one thing is to establish the facts; it is 
another thing is for an entire community to accept and acknowledge them. The relationship is no 
longer between a victim and a perpetrator but is about a collective recognition. The work carried out 
by a researcher in the case of post-conflict societies in the former Yugoslavia and the efforts to 
                                                     
15 Mallinder, Louise. Amnesty, human rights and political transitions: bridging the peace and justice divide. 
Bloomsbury Publishing, 2008; Mallinder, Louise, and Kieran McEvoy. "Rethinking amnesties: atrocity, 
accountability and impunity in post-conflict societies." Contemporary Social Science 6.1 (2011): 107-128. 
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establish the truth illustrates this complexity and the role of denial by a local community. Janine Clark 
insists that in Bosnia-Herzegovina, “there are essentially three ethnic versions of truth – the Bosnian 
Serb, the Bosnian Muslim and the Bosnian Croat – that quintessentially disagree on what happened 
during the country’s three year war, on who were the aggressors and who were the principal victims”. 
And this is so despite the ICTY’s numerous trials.16 She points out that, due in part to the importance 
of denial, “truth in post conflict societies is a far more ambiguous and problematic concept than 
supporters of criminal trials and truth and reconciliation commissions sometimes appear to 
assume”.17 
Yet, here we can determine a significant failure. The ethnic frame of society and politics more usually 
depicts acquittals of one’s own group members or prosecutions of a communal ‘other’ as vindication 
for one’s group. Successful pursuit of members of one’s own group is often downplayed or cast as 
proof of the inherent group bias against an ethnic community by international or domestic 
mechanisms.   Ethnic identity is a strong adhesive, and in nationalistic forms proves effective in 
selectively marshalling the past to its purposes. Consociationalism recognises the adhesive and 
mobilising power of ethnonationalism; yet TJ has something to add, too, as it acts in the same ecology 
as ethnonationalism—the contested past. 
 
d. Ethnonationalism and Transitional Justice - The Mutual Pull of the Past 
Consociationalism is an institutional approach to governance that takes segmental cleavages seriously 
as authentic, deep–seated facets of social organization. In the most deeply divided societies in which 
consociational government has been tried, such as Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Lebanon and 
(historically) Cyprus, these cleavages are organized around ethnonational or ethnosectarian 
communities. These divisions crystallise around identities that have been underpinned and shaped by 
historical understandings that serve as warehouses of myth and symbol and as route maps to the 
present and future. Ethnonationalism draws readily on these myth and symbol complexes from the 
past in creating boundaries between identities and fostering the narratives that foment or constrain 
group action. In the cases suggested above, we can see how ethnic narratives have prioritized 
mobilizing narratives of the past that spotlight boundaries and sharp contestation between ethnic 
groups.  Given that a key aspect of deeply divided societies is not just the existence of segmented 
political organization, but potential (often violent) contestation of the legitimacy of state structures, 
                                                     
16 Clark, J (2011) Transitional Justice, Truth and Reconciliation: An Under-Explored Relationship, 11 International 
Criminal Law Review, pp. 247-249. 
17 Id., p. 242. 
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we can see how TJ, just as consociationalism, will be interested in mechanisms that bind ethnonational 
groups to a new, hopefully legitimate, dispensation. For consociational proponents, this legitimacy 
flows from appropriately and proportionally dispersing the levers of power; for TJ, legitimacy flows 
from an accounting for past harms, the better to bed in new adherence to the rule of law. Each 
approach then has reason to take ethnonationalism seriously. 
Ethnonationalism and TJ appear to be at opposite ideological points.  The ethnic identities that form 
segmental cleavages are entities which draw up social boundaries and communicate in terms of the 
particular, not the universal. TJ is arguably a branch of the growing human rights discourse, which has 
a universal frame of reference. Yet, if we examine ethnonationalism and TJ in action we can discern 
structures that produce a similarity of focus. Each understands the influence and utility of the past as 
providing values, symbols, and resources.  It is seen as having a socializing, norm–creating role in the 
contemporary field of action. TJ and ethnonationalism each understand the past as number of things: 
a zone of contestation for legitimacy, a narrative guide for moral action in the present, and a 
storehouse of mobilizing symbols. Each may instrumentalise the past as a force for contemporary 
policy; TJ may use the past to underwrite norms that dissolve impunity and promote 
acknowledgement and reparation for historic harms; ethnonationalism reimagines narratives and 
events of the past to spotlight the endurance of identities and the necessity of group solidarity. This 
comparable reach for the past is not the result of an ideological similarity—there is no genetic linkage 
between TJ and ethnonationalism. Rather, it is the outworking of each being formed out of the same 
historical and contemporary environment. The long twentieth century has seen rapid processes of 
democratization requiring mobilizing narratives (with which the past is replete), and violent and 
extended phases of state formation, warfare and decolonization, which have ensured that the ‘past’ 
remains sometimes emotive, in many cases politically ‘unfinished’, and still structuring relations in 
society. In recent decades the past’s importance has been further amplified by a cultural ‘memory 
boom’ and a scepticism surrounding the future focused ideologies of the left or right.18 
 
e. Ethnonationalism and Transitional Justice: The Importance of Victimhood and Trauma 
TJ and ethnonationalism not only share a similar orientation in time, they can apply similar organizing 
frames in terms of narrative and individuals. Both place victimhood at their moral core. TJ processes 
                                                     
18 Torpey, John C. Making whole what has been smashed: On reparations politics. Harvard University Press, 2006; 
Nora, Pierre. "Between memory and history: Les lieux de mémoire." Representations (1989): 7-24; Winter, Jay. 
"The memory boom in contemporary historical studies." RARITAN-A QUARTERLY REVIEW 21, no. 1 (2001): 52-
66. 
11  
must be ‘victim centered’ or they are regarded as deficient; the extent to which victims sit at the heart 
of policy and implementation is used as a barometer of TJ’s effectiveness and resonance with local 
populations. To be ‘victim centered’ implies the empowerment and raising up of the silenced and 
excluded, fuller acknowledgement of harm, greater access to a range of experiences, and greater 
access for social and legal remedies. But this approach to victimhood signals more than the 
rebalancing of power relations and a wish to open out justice meaningfully and democratically. It also 
has an emotional and symbolic connotation:  the experience of traumatic suffering brings with it ‘deep 
moral knowledge’. Victims may then be strategically essentialised as ‘moral beacons’ providing insight 
into not only the immorality of harms visited upon them, but the moral worth of their forbearance, 
resistance, or forgiveness.19  
Transitional justice offers great hope to victims of serious human rights violations. It provides a new 
vocabulary of accountability and repair for those who have lost hope in the capacity of ordinary legal 
system to provide meaningful redress.  In addition to a vocabulary of harm, claim, and repair, 
transitional justice also provides important institutions and structures to process crimes of mass 
atrocity, including truth commissions, lustration and vetting procedures, administrative and judicial 
reparations schemes, and apologies. However, it is obvious that the scale of atrocity crime in most 
societies makes full repair, absolute accountability, and meaningful redress highly elusive.  For a 
variety of practical reasons, including budgetary constraints, transitional justice always works with 
partial capacity to meet the needs and expectations of victims.  Accountability for those most 
responsible inevitably means that many will go unpunished.  Limited resources mean that reparations 
will be partial or limited in their scope and reach.  By virtue of the nature of the crimes committed 
evidence will be difficult to produce, communities and individuals will be dispersed, and making legal 
systems work in the aftermath of atrocity can be a limited exercise.  All this goes to say that the 
burdens of expectation are high for transitional justice, but some pragmatism and modesty is required 
given the real-time, real-life limitations of implementing transitional justice on the ground, a set of 
tensions that co-exist with the lived realities of deals made with perpetrators that de facto 
compromise the expectations and needs of victims.  
Victims also have a representational role within the discourse of ethnonationalism. They are symbols 
and carriers of stories in relation to historic wrongs, witnesses to the perfidy of the communal ‘other’, 
and the suppression of a community. If ethnonationalism views the ‘nation’ as an organic natural 
entity, and can project it rhetorically as a great personhood, then victims become the metonyms for 
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this national being—the national story in living miniature. They thus have a deeply symbolic existence 
within the ethnonational frame, often linked to the narrative of communal struggle and resistance. 
They also help to shift the symbolic into the concrete; their stories provide often verifiable evidence 
for the narrative and add to it an emotionally accessible human face.20 For ethnonationalism, the 
memory of victimhood has still more resonance. Nationalist narratives certainly encompass stories of 
heroes and victories, but still more significance is given to martyrs, a category who usefully merge the 
status victim and hero. This provides a clue to an especially effective narrative type: nationalisms have 
an attraction to traumas and defeats.  
We can offer four reasons for this lure towards the traumatic. Firstly, it may underline a connection 
between the modern ethnonational grouping and the past, and explains the dormant or politically 
unfulfilled status of the group. Secondly, it supplies a historical injustice around which a grouping can 
mobilise, and a ‘sore thumb’ with which to illicit international support; it also presents the community 
as a durable, tested entity in ways that narratives of victory or satisfaction cannot—the group 
demonstrates its steadfastness. Lastly, it presents a narrative of the sacrificial, useful in channeling 
many forms of political resistance. Large-scale death becomes emblematic, group members died ‘for’ 
something; the trauma may even serve to carry a nationalistic narrative or moral obligation. The 
exemplary trauma of the last hundred years, genocide, has been used both as a driver within the 
universalist human rights discourse and as a mobilizing frame by ethnocratic states and 
ethnonationalist movements to reinforce their own nationalistic projects.21 TJ and ethnonationalism 
thus inhabit the same historical waters. 
 
f. Transitional Justice in the Grassroots—Consociational Compliment or Constraint? 
Consociational structures operate at the elite level; the understanding is that communal leadership 
will be able to manage its respective constituencies while meshing the gears of accommodation and 
co-operation at a higher level. A criticism is that it in focusing on the elite level, and in working to 
underwrite communal control via processes such as cultural autonomy, it is in fact entrenching 
division at a wider societal level right down to the grassroots.  The argument is that elites will do little 
to undercut their own bases of support—communally framed political parties—and civic forms of 
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representation are thereby squeezed. Indeed, liberal consociation proponents do envisage non–
ascriptive forms of identification finding room and may eventually hope that elite accommodation 
slowly filters down to communities by a process of example setting. Yet, they do not provide a detailed 
understanding of how this may actually happen; this is understandable given that in consociations 
such as Lebanon, Northern Ireland, and Bosnia, civic forms of political representation remain minority 
undertakings. Even peaceful Belgium, at the heart of the European project, has witnessed increasing 
communalisation rather than its withering, and the ferment of extremist violence whose relationship 
with the underlying state political project remains uncharted.   As recent research has argued, a 
structure inhabited by ethnic tribunes may result in wider societal buy in to the system, and resource 
allocation may be more susceptible to moderation, yet perpetual ethnic outbidding on issues of 
identity, culture and symbolism may still combust and be far less amenable to accommodation in the 
long run.22 This appears to draw a thick question mark through the aspiration of power sharing as an 
example of co-operation for wider society. Critics of a consociational elite focus have instead tended 
to shift the focus on to activating and nourishing civil society actors as a way of transforming social 
relations; civil society can act to challenge the narratives and identities of elite configurations and 
create the space for themselves to help evolve different civic forms of representation over time.23 This 
seems ambitious, but proponents critique consociationalists for their naivety in assuming that 
anything that entrenches segmented cleavages can produce a sustainable, workable system.24 Of 
course, the fact that in divided societies civil society groups are often themselves expressions of 
segmental cleavages, overloaded with bonding capital and exhibiting less in the way of bridging capital 
means that it may also be simplistic to consider civil society as always providing a civic, transformative 
force.25  
Might TJ add something missing to the elite focus of consociational systems? We have argued that 
partisan ethnic cleavages are embedded in the local, and that consociational approaches, even in their 
liberal form, are not best placed to engage with these given their elite focus and institutional 
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strengthening of communal forms of representation.26 We will now consider whether processes of TJ 
can act to fill this gap between top and bottom level interactions, or merely circle that plughole.  
The Local Turn in Transitional Justice 
Recent scholarship, whether seeking to establish new norms of interaction or supplying case studies 
of truth recovery and memory work, has shifted to a level of magnification that is designed to capture 
local processes of dealing with contentious pasts. Macro level TJ, it is argued, may be too legalistic in 
its approach, preferring to ‘see like a state’ and, in so doing, fails to adequately engage with the 
complexities of transition at the local level through skipping over certain claims and narratives, failing 
to provide for meaningful, substantive input from victims, and ultimately losing relevance and 
legitimacy in the eyes of those at the grassroots level. If we take the example of the states of the 
former Yugoslavia, we can see that evidence is mounting that higher–level TJ processes can indeed be 
resisted if they threaten ethnonational narratives, be appropriated if they valourise the same, or 
simply be ignored. 27   Releasing legalism and stepping away from the ‘state level’ horizon of 
interpretation has thus been championed as a necessary way of increasing relevance for local 
communities by allowing a fuller examination of context, engaging them as actors and not merely as 
subjects, and allowing voices to emerge which might have been previously screened out by elite level 
discourses be they either judicial or ethnonational.28  As Huma Haider warns ‘Day-to-day lived realities 
in divided societies influence whether new narratives that may emerge from court decisions or truth 
commissions alter, reinforce or have no effect on dominant stories and myths’.29  It is necessary, 
therefore, for TJ to get access to the workings of ethnonationalism in order to engage with its 
discourses. As argued above, it already wades in the waters of victimhood and the past. What is 
needed are locally based (and collaborative) designs which can channel its norms and discourses into 
the local mix of a deeply divided society. Narratives that establish identity content and boundaries are 
very much like velcro, fastening to the local group and individual as multiple hooks and eyes at the 
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micro level.30 If identity content comprises hooks that fasten hostile, simplified narratives of militancy 
and threat, or boundaries that are over communicated and encapsulating, neither macro TJ or elite 
level consociational approaches will be able to partially unpick it.  We should not imagine that 
localising TJ will be a simple case of a higher gear cog changing down and meshing with a lower one; 
the process produces friction and can cause the assumptions of macro TJ to fracture.31 Yet, it can also 
throw open new and unforeseen possibilities.32  Grounded forms of TJ may enable understandings of 
the past that are more meaningful to communities and can differ strikingly from higher political levels, 
foregrounding experiences that are at variance with ethnonational elite focus on militarism and 
resistance or international elite narratives of closure and reconciliation.33 The process may thus be 
one of vernacularisation, where ideas and practices of TJ are shaped and communicated in a way that 
produces resonance with local values.34 If there is a fear that locally–based TJ could simply supply a 
displacement battlefield that could hinder the ability of elites to manage constituencies within a 
power–sharing framework, we should acknowledge that but also point out two facts of life within 
deeply divided societies. First, that the ‘local’ may already be the happy hunting ground for ethnic 
entrepreneurs and ‘spoilers’ if they cannot yet acquire representation at governmental level; and 
second, that in matters of cultural and narrative contestation, the powersharing elites may themselves 
tack to ethnonational scripts at the local level, as a default.35 
What Might This Local Transitional Justice Look Like in a Deeply Divided Society? 
Given the social capital of ethnonationalism at the local level, reflecting resilience, authenticity, and 
narrative depth, it would be foolish for TJ processes to attempt a foisting of pre-digested norms that 
will be regarded as lacking context and relevance, and as something of an external intrusion. Rather, 
TJ could open up a space for agonistic debate, in which narratives and claims freely emerge and 
encounter one another but are also subject to challenge. Agonistic pluralism neither expects nor asks 
for a definitive end product to emerge, there need be no agreed narrative, full closure, or final 
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reconciliation. It does envisage a fundamental respect for other discourses, allowing a liberal 
circulation of narratives, but the ability of any narrative to be robustly contested is axiomatic.   
Rather than attempt to foist a series of norms that may be regarded as an intrusion or confection, and 
for which it lacks the ground level social capital to transplant in any case, a different course could be 
navigated. Looking forward, we suggest that it may be that TJ should allow spaces for agonistic (as 
opposed to antagonistic) debate, allowing these narratives to encounter one another.36 It could work 
to facilitate these narratives in both the national arena and at local levels. But the process of engaging 
in this agonistic discourse is predicated on respect, the free circulation of narrative, and the ability to 
challenge those narratives. Rather than ‘understanding reconciliation in terms of restoring a 
relationship between alienated co-members of a moral community we should attempt to free space 
to allow ethnonational orthodoxies to be routinely challenged, from both within and without the 
community’.37 It is thus a process of diffusion and complication, not of reconciliation between binaries, 
one which acknowledges ‘multiple pasts whilst offering the tools necessary to challenge all settled 
identity claims’.38 
This is the broad model, and other scholarship has advocated similar deliberative approaches that 
accept robust contestation, if not couched in an agonistic frame.39  But such a model could, however, 
flip easily into simple antagonism where the past continues to pump into the present and local forms 
of ethnonationalism just become adept at lawfare. We can certainly expect challenges around 
victimhood, so central to both TJ and ethnonationalism, to be particularly hot and recurrent. But to 
help prevent this model toppling into antagonism, TJ can provide several avenues of approach. 
Rules of Encounter 
Whilst agonism is non-prescriptive and open–ended, it does require a framework in which contested 
narratives and claims may productively interact.  Examples may be usefully drawn from a range of 
truth commissions, which could assist in shaping the terrain in which agonistic actors can meet, and 
productively work out how narratives may be presented, engaged with, and challenged. Narratives 
need not merely encounter one another in a quasi-legal setting, or in a truth commission format; local 
                                                     
36 Schaap, Andrew,. "Agonism in divided societies." Philosophy & Social Criticism 32, no. 2 (2006): 255-277; 
Schaap, Andrew, ed. Law and agonistic politics. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2009; Bell, Duncan. "Agonistic 
democracy and the politics of memory." Constellations 15, no. 1 (2008): 148-166. 
37 Schaap, Andrew,. "Agonism in divided societies." Philosophy & Social Criticism 32.2 (2006): 255-277. P.268 
38 Bell, Duncan,. "Agonistic democracy and the politics of memory."Constellations 15.1 (2008): 148-166. P.162 
39 Payne, Leigh A. Unsettling accounts: Neither truth nor reconciliation in confessions of state violence. Duke 
University Press, 2007; Rangelov, Iavor,. Nationalism and the Rule of Law: Lessons from the Balkans and Beyond. 
Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
17  
forms of agonism could adopt forms which more broadly based types of transitional justice have 
implemented such as oral history projects, exhibitions, or school curricula. 
Providing Claims Making Tools  
In processes of memory making, commemoration, and shaping narratives of the past, law can be 
invoked in inventive ways. Actors outside of an obviously legal context have creatively employed 
statutes, international law, ‘soft’ law, declarations, and even case law.40  
This could inflect claims which have relied on partisan and particularist frameworks and which have 
therefore closed off dialogue rather than opening it out to agonism.  Law can also be used to open up 
archives and push new evidence into the wider public sphere; this could enhance agonistic processes 
and not just by adding extra facts to bolster argument. As new information emerges, perhaps 
confounding simplistic views of a conflict, fissures within ethnonational structures and discourses 
could develop. Within these openings there may be greater space for reflexivity, disruptive thinking, 
and intersectionality. Increasingly, too, there is recognition that the opening up is cyclical, as 
discourses of post-transitional justice reveal, TJ may well be more of a loop than an end point.  A 
rapidly developing form of TJ has been that of memorialization and commemoration; as well as 
providing some measure of symbolic reparation, commemoration can serve as a sounding board to 
articulate claims in public spaces. These may be ‘single identity’ but not expressly in an ethnonational 
frame, shifting robust, critical engagement into a different type of discourse.41  
A Means to Draw Out or Test Narratives  
There is a strong role for historical commissions if they can be linked to local settings. Employing a 
broad range of historians, social scientists, and lawyers, commissions might prove useful in testing the 
reliability and accuracy of locally–based narratives, and also simply providing a circulation of these 
narratives that provides them with a wider public space.42  Such narratives also provide the means to 
engage in active “myth-busting,” undoing misconceptions and even deep factual inaccuracies that 
have permeated popular consciousness in deeply divided societies. These myths often underpin deep 
and intractable victimhood pathologies and the ‘othering’ that occurs between ethnically, religiously 
or socially divided groups.   In parallel, feminist scholarship has much to add here as it champions a 
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willingness to detect and uncover silences and provides a focus on the ‘everyday’ thereby offering a 
different understanding of communal harms.43 An agonistic process precludes definitive verdicts on 
truth claims but militant or essentialising mythologies may be weakened by historical commissions.  
Alternatively, if agonistic actors accept group claims as convincing, they may seep through 
ethnonational boundaries, having been provided with a degree of validation.  We might imagine it in 
this way: the evidential standards of the academy, together with legal processes, are important 
validating resources to which an ethnonational actor is attracted; but in reaching for and using them, 
groups could well be obliged to moderate the particularism of their own truth claims. Notions of 
equality, fair dealing, and respect for pluralism which are often built into consociations would thus be 
telescoped to the local level.  It could introduce pluralism at an intra–communal level, too. 
Ethnonational frames can put simplifying screen memories in front of intersectional claims of internal 
sub groups, and so any shift to universal norms may also provide a challenge to insider elites.44  TJ and 
historical inquiry may also be useful in illuminating patterns of harms that occurred in ethnonational 
struggles; this could work to broaden the definition of harm in ways that disrupt simple ethnonational 
framing. TJ could also provide a simple but particularly helpful function: tallying the extent of harms 
accurately could work to dissolve mythologies of sole suffering and the outbidding instrumentalisation 
of victimhood. 
A Need for Caution and Realism 
When engaging with the ‘grassroots’ in a deeply divided society, levelheadedness and realistic 
expectations are necessary.  We can perhaps see this in consociationalism’s unwillingness to commit 
itself to prescriptions much beyond elite management; it will settle for agreement at the top which 
will constrain conflict and just possibly set the mood music for deeper accommodation. The lessons 
of ethnic tribune politics show that this music is often a contrapuntal rhythm and difficult to stay in 
step to. If we advocate a grounded focus for TJ as a way of addressing this, we do so in the full 
knowledge that the local ecology can be a thicket that can work to repel interlopers. Hence the 
agonistic approach, which sees civil society as producing thorns as well as nectar. 
We can speedily delineate the problems of engagement. West European and North American thinking 
on civil society frames it as promoting liberal democratic norms and creating a new civic space, one in 
opposition to particularist claims; this reflects an incomplete understanding of ethnonationalism as 
being irrational, the product of scheming elites, and which ignores the importance of ethnic bonds in 
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societies. 45  It is rather the case that civil society groups can be inflected by ethnonational 
memberships to a greater or lesser extent. In many instances, they may be more appropriately seen 
as particularist, not integrative, as ethnic civil societies. 46  They may also be ‘captured’ by state 
institutions;47 less of a problem in a consociation one might think, but if the power–sharing deal 
encompasses federalism then this leaves the possibility of capture by federal entities. Our agonistic 
approach whilst factoring in endemic contestation, also requires certain fundamentals: a wish to 
engage and an acceptance of reciprocal rights to be heard. These need not be forthcoming from the 
grassroots, where disagreement over equivalence, sequencing, timeframes, and overall intent of 
projects, speedily work to dissolve local engagement. 48 More fundamentally, local dialogue may be 
greatly inhibited because whilst in a more consensual society many interpretive horizons are 
accessible to citizens as part of their everyday lives, in a divided society ‘the capacity to choose from 
these interpretative horizons is constricted, both in terms of discourse and in terms of socially 
acceptable behaviour.’49 In other words ethnonationalism has powerfully narrowed what are deemed 
appropriate ways of looking at society, despite attempts to push past these boundaries, but it need 
not prevail in every case of engagement and interaction.50 
Within this discussion we have presented TJ as neither confection nor constraint but rather 
complement to consocationalism.  We have a constructively critical approach to consociational 
structures that acknowledge that it allows for the pursuit of claims at the elite level but has avoided 
how sectional identities and claims play out at the local. This has meant that any benefits of elite co-
operation can fail to transfer to the grassroots—a major problem given that the ‘local’ is the forcing 
house of ethnonationalism in all its varieties, militant or otherwise. TJ, if properly attuned can get at 
the local in ways which consociationalism does not. Consociationalism by necessity has an institutional 
focus, whereas TJ has a narrative sensitivity, which is conversant with the power of historical accounts, 
and attuned to the discourse of victimhood and trauma.  The local model we have sketched, drawing 
on a grassroots turn in TJ, is about robust engagement within a setting of co-existence rather than 
reconciliation. It is one that encourages pluralism, and may defuse the worst of combustible 
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mythologies, whilst allowing space for intersectional voices, and unheard stories to complicate simple 
binaries.  It does not provide Potemkin village initiatives of brief, symbolic harmony. Expectations need 
to be set realistically. The environment is difficult. This is not reconciliation, but neither TJ nor 
consociationalism have been shown to assuredly deliver that. Both could however work together in a 
complementary fashion, providing a ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ engagement that acknowledges but is not 
subservient to group difference.  
 
